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Abstract
We show that the criticism of a recent comment [1] on the insecurity of a
quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in [2] is based on a misconception
about the meaning of security and hence is invalid. The same misconception also
appears in another comment of the authors [3] on the security of an entangled-
based quantum key distribution protocol [4, 5].
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In a couple of comments [1], [3], it has been argued that the protocols of quantum
key distribution proposed in [4] and [5], and the quantum secret sharing protocol
proposed in [2] are insecure. The basic idea of these comments is based on a strategy
in which Eve entangles herself with the state already possessed by Alice and Bob and
by suitable manipulations intercepts the odd-numbered bits without being recognized
by Alice and Bob.
In the original articles [5, 2, 4], the possibility of entanglement of Eve with the states
already possessed by Alice and Bob has been taken into account and methods for pre-
venting her from acquiring useful information has been devised. However the authors
of these two comments show that Eve can perform suitable operations to intercept
only the odd-numbered bits without being recognized by Alice and Bob. Hence they
conclude that the protocols are insecure.
While I agree with the mathematical analysis of these comments, I should point
out that this analysis by no means implies the insecurity of the above mentioned
protocols, for a very simple reason: It is not a random sequence of bits which are
intercepted by Eve, but a fixed subset, known to the two legitimate parties. The
legitimate parties can simply discard the odd-numbered bits when they want to es-
tablish their key. They can even use their protocol as before for communicating
predetermined messages, by encoding their messages in the even round bits, inter-
spaced by stray random bits in the odd rounds.
To put this in the simplest form, they can communicate the word
REPLY (1)
through the following sequence
X R X E X P X L X Y (2)
in which X stands for stray bits whose interception by Eve does not convey any in-
formation to her.
These protocols could have been proved insecure only if Eve could intercept a
sequence of bits unknown to the two parties.
The only viable result of the above comments is that they show that the rate of
information transmission (measured against the actual number of bits transmitted)
is not equal to 1, as previously thought in the above references, but is one half that
value. This value is now equal to the value in the BB84 protocol in which half of the
bits are discarded due to the mismatch of the directions of spin measurements.
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